Atticus vecut au IIeme siecle, probablement a la fin du regne de Marc-Aurele. Contre les doctrines de son temps qui cherchait a fusionner les theories de Platon et d'Aristote, Atticus pronait un platonisme epure, loin de tout eclectisme. Cette position philosophique lui valut l'hostilite de ses contemporains, notamment d'Ammonius, et compromit sa reputation aupres de toute la tradition posterieure, si bien qu'aujourd'hui nous ne connaissons ses oeuvres que de maniere indirecte, par Eusebe de Cesaree pour la plus grande partie. (...) Ainsi n'avons-nous de ses ecrits qu'une vision partiale autant que partielle. Il semble avoir ecrit un Traite de l'ame, et des commentaires de grands textes de Platon, comme le Timee ou le Phedon. La presente edition regroupe l'ensemble des fragments attribues, a ce jour, au philosophe neo-platonicien, notamment le texte Contre ceux qui se flattent d'interpreter Platon par Aristote. Une riche notice introductive fait le point sur les connaissances relatives a l'auteur et a son oeuvre, et fournit toutes les informations necessaires a la bonne intelligence cette vaste nebuleuse du neoplatonisme. De judicieux paralleles sont dresses en particulier avec Ammonius. Des notes accompagnent la lecture et sont developpees, en fin de volume, par des notes complementaires. L'ouvrage est en outre enrichi d'un Index Verborum ab Eusebio, d'un Index Fontium ainsi que d'un Index auctorum ab attico laudatorum. (shrink)

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

This article relates four concepts present in the thought of Édouard Glissant (poetics, optionality, exteriority, and unlearning) to show that they are also present in different authors of decolonial theory. These concepts lead us out of the framework of modern hypercriticism and allow us to enter into a philosophy of relation that opens up new possibilities for intercultural encounters. Through the constant recourse to the contrast between Glissant and the decolonial school, the text goes through its classic themes, such as (...) the coloniality of power, knowledge and being, and decolonial pedagogy and feminism. (shrink)

<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ intellectual community. (...) Two papers are dedicated to the following four topics:</P> <P></P> <UL> <LI>Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)</LI> <LI>Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)</LI> <LI>Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)</LI> <LI>Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).</LI></UL> <P></P> <P>Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.</P> <P></P> <P> </P>. (shrink)

In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors, such as the analysis of concepts.

Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make (...) sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest. (shrink)

" Descartes ne qualifie sa cosmologie que sous le modeste diminutif d'une "fable du monde". Ceci peut s'interpréter comme l'aveu d'une impuissance de la raison à atteindre l'authentique fabrique du monde. Mais avant d'être une fiction dénuée de toute vérité, une fable est d'abord un récit, comme celui que l'Ecriture propose au premier livre de la Genèse. Nous enquêtons ici sur le commentaire cartésien de la Genèse, texte perdu, mais suffisamment avancé pour que Descartes envisageât, en 1640, de le soumettre (...) à l'approbation de la Sorbonne. Qu'y aurait-il montré? Qu'en concevant le mouvement comme une séparation réciproque des parties de l'étendue, il se conformait à la lettre au récit mosaïque de la création. Descartes s'appuie sur une lecture précise de la Genèse, mais une lecture si originale et si peu orthodoxe qu'il doit presque aussitôt renoncer à en faire une caution pour sa philosophie naturelle. Nous enquêtons donc moins sur cet In Genesim, que sur les raisons de sa disparition. ". (shrink)

We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the (...) debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period (...) – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward. (shrink)

La philosophie des Lumières, les droits de l'homme et le principe de laïcité qui s'en inspirent constituent le socle des institutions de la France, mais c'est la mort du Roi, symbolique de celle du Père et de Dieu, qui scelle le pacte républicain. Or, Dieu est une dimension incontournable de la conscience humaine. On ne peut le nier. On ne peut que l'intégrer. C'est pourquoi la souveraineté populaire de Jean-Jacques Rousseau ne sera que le visage inversé de l'absolutisme royal. Les (...) pays anglo-saxons ont préservé, grâce à la Réforme Protestante, une relation à la transcendance. Ce sont leurs principes auxquels aujourd'hui est confrontée la France à l'occasion de sa rencontre avec l'Europe, en même temps que dans sa relation aux Etats-Unis. La mort de Dieu, les Droits de l'Homme, tels que les ont définis les révolutionnaires de 1789, n'engendrent-ils pas un retour du refoulé qui serait à l'origine des totalitarismes? A travers une lecture de Rousseau, de Nietzsche, de Marx, de Foucault, Edouard VALDMAN met au jour avec acuité, en se référant à Arendt et Lévinas, la Blessure qui est à l'origine de la France contemporaine : son parricide. Il démontre que l'Europe ne pourra se réaliser que si elle est en mesure de s'élever au-dessus des Etats-Nations qui la composent, à travers un principe transcendant posant comme fondement de sa future Constitution celui de la pluralité humaine. " L'homme dépasse infiniment l'homme! " Pascal. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

This article develops a new, general account of replication. I argue that a replication is an experiment that resamples the experimental components of an ori...

Excerpt from Essay on the Bases of the Mystic Knowledge Must we believe that Mysticism is like "some vast ocean, the empire of illusion" where adventurous thinkers go astray, or is it a state of direct intuition which may be claimed by right, as divinely imparted? The question presents itself to us with this alternative: either Mysticism contains a negation of thought worse than Scepticism, or it is the most perfect activity of the mind. If it be that Mysticism is (...) only obstinate persistence to know the unknowable, we shall have to accept the first conclusion. The pursuit of the impossible perverts our faculties and makes them unfit for their natural use. But, should Mysticism prove to be an experience distinct from what we understand by the word "knowing," it would be worth our while to inquire if something new is introduced into the consciousness, and in what ways. Reason is in possession of too much light to be able to remain quite at ease in the region of clear ideas, but not enough to know first principles of actual knowledge. In this penumbra who can trace the exact limit of perceptions and say where the true disappears in the probable, where the probable vanishes in illusion? About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. (...) Furthermore, we argue that these difficulties derive from their exclusive reliance on the notion of information, so we suggest that pure informational accounts should be complemented with functional approaches. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Tracés. Revue de Sciences humaines, n° 4, 2003. Nous remercions Édouard Gardella de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Pour un cheminement vers la notion de « self » (Goffman) Là où l'âme prétend s'unifier, là où le Moi s'invente une identité ou une cohérence, le généalogiste part à la recherche du commencement – des commencements innombrables […]. Suivre la filière complexe de la provenance, […] c'est découvrir qu'à la racine de ce (...) que nous connaissons et de ce que nous sommes, (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that (...) life cannot be defined. In the latter case, I argue that, although defining life may be possible, it is pointless. I conclude that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life. (shrink)